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The Clash of Christological Symbols:
A Case for Metaphoric Realism
Robert Masson

In musical composition, a clash of cymbals signifies a dramatic
moment in a passage. But its significance can vary. The force of brass
plates can simply call attention to a phrase, voice, anthem, or transition in the arrangement. It can emphasize a thematic development, a
musical notation anticipating a later twist or crescendo-or indicate
that climax itself. It can signal a harmonious resolution of previous
chords, or a rhapsody of dissonant voices. There are the occasions
when a clash of cymbals heralds an extraordinary expression of musical creativity and genius: an adventitious musical gesture that brings
together quite different voices in a way that enables the composition
to express itself in a new idiom. At such moments cymbals announce
a new musical vocabulary, a new form of expression. It is not just that
something unexpected is said. The juxtaposition of the di sparate voices
creates a way to say something that cou ld not have been said before.
What it expresses is made possible only through the arrangement's
invention of new possibilities of meaning created by its forcing a combination of musical phrases that until this composition had not been
envisioned. The audience hears something it has never heard beforeand could not have been expected to hear until this musical passage
itself created the space for the hearing.
Such compositions can be extremely demanding for the audience.
Understanding these pieces requires a stretch of sensibilities, a flexibility of affection, and suppleness of comprehension--even a reformation of one's register of meanings. Some in the gallery might not
get the point. Others might not appreciate it. But for those who do, the
clash of cymbals signals the advent of new meaning. The disparate
voices are not reduced to one or the other-not harmonized in a famil62
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iar resolution. The uncalled-for juxtaposition is much more than a cacophonous celebration of dissonance. The composition is inspired, a
revelation. That is what happens, for example, in great symphonies
and great jazz. Indeed, symphony and jazz as distinct genres are themselves inventions of such musical genius.
The clash of christological symbols signals comparable dynamics
in the movements of Christian thinking and discourse. The New Testament attests to a variety of images and potential trajectories for comprehending the significance of Jesus. Clashes among them preoccupied theological concerns for the flfst four centuries. The "official
libretto and score" views the resolution of the christological and related trinitarian debates as a thematic progression-in Catholic parlance, as a development of doctrine. The earlier clashes call attention
to distinct voices whose disparate and incomplete insights are harmonized at Nicaea and ChaIcedon. The councils' determinations of phrasing provide the foundational chords and so are normative for subsequent advances. Still, progression is possible, even necessary, because
of the inherent tension between the chordal elements. The councils
resolved that the human and divine notes must be played together, but
in the definition of Chacedon, "unmixed and unchanged, undivided
and unseparated.'" The terms are inescapably contrapuntal and analogous. Hence, as Rahner famously emphasized, ChaIcedon is a beginning rather than an end for further theological meditation and development. 2
Roger Haight's Jesus Symbol of God argues for an emended libretto and score.) As he sees it, the official rendition glosses the plurality of discordant voices in the New Testament. The scenario is not
attentive to the genesis of the phrases intoned at Nicaea and ChaIcedon,
and so mistakes the movement' s finale for the originating notes that it
was meant to express. Haight contends that attention to the history of
the controversies establishes that the original meaning that generated
the christological formulas of the councils was not-and is not- identical to the formulations themselves, and indeed should be distinguished
from them. Moreover, the official story line takes the movement toward that particular paradigm, the incarnation of the divine Logos in
the human as sarx or anthropos, as a necessary and normative development. So doing precludes as orthodox any interpretations of Jesus'
significance that appeal for inspiration and resources to voices in the
New Testament that do not fit thi s pattern.
Haight challenges the notion that these developments were inevi-
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table. This scenario is especially problematic, he alleges, because it
does not render an account that ean speak credibly to the rustorical
sensibilities of postmodern consciousness. He insists that the problem
is not with what Chalcedon intended and affLrmed (the divinity and
salvific significance of Jesus) but with the theoretical tools the council
had at its disposal to express its intention. While the council played
the divine and human notes as contrapuntal, Hrught c1rums that the
incarnate Logos paradigm did not provide the means to insure that the
counterpoint would be clearly heard in subsequent generations and
theologies. Indeed, the attempted counterpoint appears inevitably to
resolve to a dimini shed humanity. Hence, if one is to take seriously
Jesus ' humanity and contemporary conceptions of what full humanity
entails, the official score poses impossible conceptual dilemmas .
Haight' s revisionist libretto and score put forward a detailed, multifaceted, and provocative strategy for defending in our present context the affirmation that Jesus is divine and savior. I propose a third
libretto and score as a clarification of the official analogical reading
and as an alternative to Hrught's di alectical and symbolic reading. The
trurd possibility is a metaphoric reading. Metaphoric, as distinct from
metaphorical , refers to an epistemological process that creates the
possibility for new meanings, illustrated, for example, by the previous
description of the creation of a new musical idiom.
The role of the metaphoric process in generating such new understandings in science and theology has been analyzed in some depth by
Mary Gerhart and Allan Russel1. 4 Metaphoric process, in the specific
sense in which they define it, offers a more effective way to explain
the Chri stian affirmation of identity between Jesus and God-more
effective because it suggests how to mruntain credibly the realism of
both the identity claim and the affirmation of Jesus' full humanity,
while also accounting for the ways in which these affirmations stretch
language to new uses and stretch believers to new horizons of understanding and action.
While I acknowledge, then, the considerable merit in Hrught' s contention that the issue of how language, concepts, and realities signify
God is a decisive one for contemporary christologies, my considerations vie for a different Libretto on that same issue. Hrught's extended,
systematic analysis confronts a number of issues that are problematic
today for many thoughtful people and that are not convincingly explained by academic theology or adequately addressed by church pro-
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nouncements. But my ai m is not an appraisal of these broader issues
in Haight' s proposals, or of his christology as such or as a whole.
Reservations about key aspects in only one of the many lines of argumentation he advances prompt my suggestions and provide the context for developing them. My purpose is narrow: to sketch an outline
of a constructive alternative for understanding the logic of Christian
talk about Jesus' significance.
For our purposes, three moves are crucial in Haight' s efforts to
retrieve the authentic meaning behind Nicaea and Chalcedon, and to
articulate an alternative orthodox christology. First, he argues that
symbolic mediation provides the key for interpreting religious language and for explaining Jesus' significance. Second, he assumes that
the coherence between Paul Tillich 's and Karl Rahner's theologies of
the symbol is sufficient to warrant a relati vely undifferentiated appropriation of their positions in support of the first thesis. Third, he argues that a genetic interpretation of scriptural and patristic christological
formulation s precludes unwarranted extensions of their senses beyond
the meanings that generated them .
There is something of a circularity to Haight's argument-legitimately so-and he acknowledges it. That applies to the three conceptual moves at issue here. Hi s appropriation of TiUich and Rahner determines his understanding of symbol , which in turn shapes his genetic
interpretation of christology, his critique and revi sion of Rahner's
christology, and hi s constructive argument for a Spirit christology. To
this I add that Tillich ' s and Rahner's theologies of symbol are both
instances of what Gerhart and Russell have described as metaphoric
process. This addition enlarges the interpretive circle and complicates
further the question about the most appropriate point of entry into the
discussion. Haight 's conflation of Tillich ' s and Rahner's theologies
of symbol suggests itself as an opportune ingress. It is not the most
important of these issues, nor is it illegitimate to appropriate compatible insights from otherwise contrary arguments . But the conflation
does offer a direct path to the divergence between my metaphoric and
Haight' s symbolic librettos.

Conflation of Tillich's and Rahner's Theologies of Symbol
Although Hai ght's theory of the sy mbolic draws on numerous
sources, it appeals particularly to Tillich and Rahner. There is no ques-
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lion that there are strikjng parallels in their phenomenological characterizations of symbol and the symbolic. The issue that demands attention is the fundamental djfference between their approaches. In Dynamics of Theology, Haight admits that he brings "together in what
may appear to be a too smooth and easy way elements" from their
theologies of symboLSHe adds, though, that "despite these djfferences,
I see no fundamental antithesis between these two theologies of symbol. Rather I see Rahner much more willing to emphasize the ' is' side
of the dialectic between symbol and symbolized, especially in the case
of the concrete symbol Jesus."6 The important point, he insists, is that
"the dialectical structure is still present in Rahner's christology, despite his tendency to emphasize Jesus ' being the actuality of God in
the world. Moreover, this must be the case for his christology to be
judged consistent with Chalcedon which ... is a strictly dialectical
confession. "7
But there is more to this difference than a question of emphasis.
There is a fundamental antithesis between these theologies of symbol.
Haight's comment begs the real issue of how to understand the dialectic between symbol and symbolized, between, as he puts it, the "is"
and the " is not." Both theologies of symbol were developed to address
that very issue. The difficulty is that Tillich 's notion of symbol, and
Hajght's appropriation of it, rules out-and is intended to rule out-a
priori the very conception of symbol and symbolic that Rahner' s theory
seeks to legitimate.
For theological , ontological, and christological reasons, Tillich
maintains, and Haight with him, that the symbolized points beyond
itself to something else. Thi s precludes any sort of proper identity between symbol and symbolized. There can be no direct or literal sense
in whjch one could say that the symbol "is" the symbolized. The "is
not" always trumps the "is." Properly speaking, Jesus is a man not
God. For TiUich, both the Protestant principle's stricture against idolatry
and the infinite qualitative difference between finite beings and the
ground of being require thjs . "That which is the true ultimate," TiUich
emphasizes, "transcends the realm of finjte reality infinitely. Therefore, no finite reality can express it directly and properly."8Both Haight
and Tillich insist that the integrity of Jesus' historical existence requires an uncompromising affirmation of hi s humanity. To say that
christology is dialectical means for them that the identity between Jesus
and God can be no more than the sort of transparency by which any
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finite reality, in principle, can point beyond itself to the ground of
being.
Neither Haight, nor Tillich, intends by this restriction to deny the
appropriateness of affirming that Jesus is truly symbol of God . Haight
takes pains to stress that it is indeed God who is encountered in Jesus;
that God is uniquely-even though not exclusively-encountered in
him; and that the point of explaining how Jesus, as symbol, mediates
God is to facilitate the worship of God in him, not to undermine it.
Nevertheless, it is only in pointing beyond himself and hi s humanity
that Jesus mediates God . It is only in that qualified sense that he can
be called divine or worshiped. Haight is emphatic: "One must recognize immediately that as a human being Jesus is Jesus, is not God, but
points away from himself to God . Only then can the human mind begin to recognize certain contours of God within the reality of Jesus."9
Hence, Haight, following Tillich, uses "symbol ," "symbolic," and
"dialectical" restrictively . The terms designate "mediation" of the divine but always with the qualification, in Tillich 's language, of the
"absolute break" and "infinite jump" between symbol and what it symbolizes. 'o
One can find wording in Rahner that might appear equivalent to
Haight's definition of a symbol "as something that mediates something other than itself."" Likewise, Rahner's language might also seem
to suggest that "a symbol makes present something else."' 2 Rahner' s
conception of the symbol , however, is not derived from a phenomenological account of the relation between symbol and symbolized.
Penetrating the point of Rahner's notion is clearly a situation where
Haight's principle of genetic hermeneutics should apply. A genetic
approach interprets a concept's sense by tracing the development of
the meanings that generated it. Explanations that contradict the intentionality of the originating logic are deemed unwarranted.
So what explains the genesis of Rahner's notion? "What is going
on in this development? Why is this move being made rather than
another? What is at stake in this theological decision?" 13 Rahner was
quite explicit about this in his seminal essay on "The Theology of
Symbol." '4 He was looking for a more original explanation of the
relation between symbol and symbolized than the phenomenological
traces of its mediation that Haight and Tillich chart. He believed he
found such an explanation in the insight that beings themselves areand even being itself is-symbolic.
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Every being, he argued, consists of a plurality in unity. The plural
elements can be distinguished frorp the underlying unity that they express, and in that sense the plurality can be considered a kind of "other"
or "otherness." But it is an "otherness" intrinsic to the unity and expressive of it-the way embodiment (the body itself and bodily gestures) expresses a person. On the one hand, the only access to persons
is in their embodiment. We are our bodies. On the other hand, there is
something fundamentally dialectical about personal embodiment. We
are not simply our bodies. One can-and indeed must-distinguisb
between persons and their embodiments. In extreme situations (for
example, such as deception, mental illness, the influence of pain, drugs,
or stress, or in death) bodily expressions are in varying degrees no
longer properly speaking a person's self-expression or embodiment.
Hence there are genuine and proper senses in which what confronts us
in the body and embodiment both "is" and "is not" the person himself
or herself. Rahner contends that something like this is true of the relation between plurality and unity in all beings.'5
For Haight and Tillich, symbol mediates something other than itself. For Rahner, symbol , in the most original and basic sense, is the
otherness of a being itself through which the being is expressed. The
"otherness" is not, as Haight says undialectically, "something else."
This most basic "othemess"-what Rahner calls Rea/symbol to distinguish it from more derivative instances of the symboUc-both "is"
and "is not" identical with the symbolized. Ironically, Rahner's position is more complex, more dialectical than Haight' s and Tillich's.
His aim is to explain how the identity both "is" and "is not" at the
same time. He argues against expectations that for such Realsymbols
unity and diversity correlate in like, not inverse, proportion. ' 6 Hence
his point is to legitimate a kind of identity between symbol and symbolized, which Haight and Tillich bar on principle.
Rahner argues further, appealing to the doctrine of the Trinity, that
divine be-ing itself is symbolic in this sense. This is clearly the antithesis ofTillich's theological and philosophical convictions. God is not
symbolic for him. Being itself is beyond the polarities of finite beings
that enable one thing to symbolize another, and that enable all things,
in so far as they point beyond themselves to their ground, to symbolize the ground itself. Rahner, too, stresses that God is not another being in the world, alongside it, or even beyond it. But Rahner does not
conclude that the qualitative difference between God and creature re-
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stricts the logic of symbol in the same way. Hence, he does not endorse at all the kind of "symbol ic realism" advocated by Haight. Rather,
the point of Rahner' s theology of symbol is to provide a prulosophical
rationale for conceptions of "dialectic," "symbolic," and "symbolic
realism," wruch clearly differs from and stands opposed to what Haight
intends by these notions. Rahner' s point is not simply to emphasize
the "is" at the expense of the "is not." Hi s point is to argue that a very
different logic (or dialectic) applies in trus situation-one in which
symbolized and symbol, unity and distinction, divine and human, contrary to expectations, are not reduced to one or the other, not harmonized in an artificial resolution, and not played in opposition to one
another as properly "other" and different.
Given the genesis and contrary thrust of Rahner's theology of symbol, I conclude that although Haight uses language that often is similar to Rahner's, Haight cannot legitimately appeal , at least without
further and substantial clarification, to Rahner' s position, or the many
theologies inspired by it, to warrant his position. This also raises more
fundamental questions about Haight's critique and reinterpretation of
Rahner's christology than Haight acknowledges in his publications.
Likewise, it requires much clearer distinctions between the various
senses of "symbol," "symbolic," "symbolic realism," and "dialectical" in our ongoing discussions of the logic of Christian talk about
Jesus' significance. Otherwise our theological discussions will result
in an obfuscation of what Christians are about in such di scourse rather
than lead to the sort of clarification for wruch Haight rightly calls.

Symbolic and Metaphoric Readings
Although such qualifications bring us to the nub of contention
between Tillich's and Rahner's theologies of symbol , this does not
yet elucidate the difference between Haight' s symbolic libretto for
christology and the case for a metaphoric reading . Nor does it clarify
the most basic difference between Tillich 's and Rahner's understandings of the logic of theological predication. The terms Rahner typically uses to describe such di scourse are "analogical ," "transcendental ," and " mystagogical," not "symbolic." These preferences
signify further divergences that need explanation. As Haight remarks,
symbol.ic knowledge can be defined and distingui shed from metaphor and other forms of speech in a variety of ways. There is no
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standard usage.17 A more differentiated account is required.
When Christians seek to articulate the significance of Jesus, they
are forced inevitably to stretch the'available language and conceptual
frameworks. That happens already in the scriptures. Followers of Jesus
have an arsenal of linguistic tools at their disposal for thi s: not only
symbol and literal speech but metaphor, parable, allegory, analogy ,
personification , paradox, myth, poetry, narratives of various kinds,
and so on. The later christological controversies can be viewed in part
as efforts at dealing with this diversity. They attempt to distinguish
when language is stretched too far and when not far enough; to di scern when the stretching is revealing and when obfuscating; and to
decide what stretching of language, generated in particular communities and circumstances, is acceptable to broader communities of belief
in different contexts, and what is not tolerable. It should be admitted
that any attempt to account for this exceedingly rich play of language
and arduous communal discernment under a single rubric, whether
"sy mbolic" or "metaphoric," risks oversimplification and distortion.
Such theories must be advanced with reservations and modesty. But
still an accounting of how language and thinking can be legitimately
stretched is necessary, and unavoidable. We must have such an account if we are to make judgments about the logical limits of such
linguistic and conceptual moves, or to settle interpretati ve questions
about the "point" of particular terms and formulations, or to develop a
hermeneutics to help adjudicate between alternative ways of speaking
and thinking about God and Jesus.

Gerhart and RusseLL
The advantage of the theory of metaphoric process advanced by
Gerhart and Russell is that it focuses particularly on the epistemological moves in religion and science in which genuinely new possibilities
for understanding and meaning emerge. Put very simply, their theory
envi sions situations in which a novel analogy is forced between two
notions in our available world of meanings.
Their argument presupposes that our inquiries about the world and
ourselves take place in what can be imagined as cognitive spaces or
worlds of meanings. These worlds of meanings are made up of networks of interrelated concepts. Physics, theology, a religion, and common sense as defined by a particular time and culture are examples of
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such fields of meanings. The concepts within these fields do not stand
directly for things in themselves, but for our notions of these things.
These notions are defined by their interrelation with other notions.
For example, to get some conception of "house," one must have other
notions available (lumber, bricks, wall, window, roof, and so forth).
These other notions are variable, as well as the relations between
them, so meaning "arises out of the interaction of concepts and relations, and is expressed in the topography of the field. Necessary concept changes, such as those which might arise from a new experience, alter relations; and changes in relations, such as occur when
one attempts to understand an experience in a new way , relocate old
concepts." 18
Gerhart and Russell speak of an analogy as "forced" when it involves an affirmation of an identity between two "knowns" that, given
current understandings, is unwarranted . In the world of Copernicus,
for example, the affirmation that the sun and not the earth is the center
was uncalled for. In Newton's world, to afflrm that the laws of heaven
and the laws of earth are the same was unreasonable. In the world of
meanings available to Palestinian Jews at the time of Jesus' death, the
warrants for identifying him as the Messiah were questionable at best.
The first thing that distinguishes these particular analogies is that,
despite their apparent unreasonableness, forcing them does not result
in nonsense. Quite to the contrary, twisting accustomed meanings in
these situations opens up possibilities for understanding that had not
been available before, just as stretching the elements of musical composition can create a new idiom such as jazz.
The second thing that distinguishes such uncalled-for analogies is
the disruptive effect on the fields of meanings associated with them .
Copernicus's insistence that the sun is the center, or Newton 's insistence that the laws of terrestrial motion are identical with the laws of
planetary motion, changed related notions within physics in most fundamental ways.19 So the force of the analogies did not simply add new
information to the world of physics, expanding it the way the discovery of a new planet or a new mechanical law might have. Nor did it
clarify the given world of meanings, the wayan apt analogy between
something known and something unknown might have. By Newton's
time both Galileo's and Kepler's laws already were known. The uncalled-for analogies had a more "tectonic" or "metaphoric" effect because they forced a reconfiguration in the until-then accepted fields of
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meanings. The result was newly shaped fields of meanings that constitute a better understanding of what we know of reality.20
This effect-the creation of significant changes in fields of meanings-I take to be the fundamental characteristic of the metaphoric
analogy. That is what disti nguishes it from rhetorical moves we more
commonly label "metaphor" or "metaphorical" in which forcing a new
analogy extends the meaning of terms within a field of meanings but
does not reshape the field of meanings itself. (In Gerhart and Russell's
theory "metaphoric" and "metaphorical" are not equivalent. And on
their accounting many metaphors are not genuinely metaphoric because they do not create the possibility for new meaning by creating
fundamental shifts in our fields of meanings.)
For example, the affLrmation that "Jesus is the Messiah" effects
such a change in fields of meanings. Given the images current in the
eschatology of the day, affirming that God was victorious in the crucified son of a carpenter from Nazareth was uncalled for. In fact most of
the key eschatological images by which Jesus is identified in the gospels have something of this metaphoric dimension. By ordinary logic
he was not a victorious King of Israel; he was not a Son of Man who
descended gloriously from the heavens; he was not acknowledged by
his people nor did he vanquish their enemies. To affirm that Jesus is
the Messiah is to force an analogy between him and Israel's expressions of hope and trust in God. This in tum requires a different understanding of God, Israel's hope, and Jesus. Affmning that Jesus is the
Messiah, if taken seriously, forces a thoroughgoing revision of the
field of meanings operative in Palestinian Judaism, or at least those
operative in the narrative worlds of the New Testament.
This leads us to the third factor that disti nguishes the metaphoric
process. The shifts of meaning entailed in it typically make a new
logic available. Conceptual moves are possible in Einstein's world
that were inconceivable in Newton 's, and moves in Newton's world
would not have made sense in Galileo's. Likewise, the affirmation
that Jesus is Messiah reconfigures the meaning of "Messiah," the identity of Jesus, and the field of meanings associated with messianic hope.
This makes possible a logical move otherwise unavailable and lays
the groundwork for later moves otherwise unthinkable.
Several entaiJments of this conceptual step are noteworthy. First,
there is no hedging of the "is" in the claim "Jesus is Messiah." The
logic of this move loses its force if Jesus is not in some sense properly
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and literally the Messiah. I use "litera]" here purposefully but advisedly. The conception of metaphoric process destabilizes the meaning
of "literal" itself and warrants this qualified use. Although reference
to the literal meaning often presupposes that exact and primary meanings are univocal and constant, and that fields of meanings are stable,
the metaphoric process demonstrates that this is not always the case.
In a metaphoric affirmation words come to have new exact and primary meanmgs. Moreover, these meanings can be semantically proper,
10gicaJly warranted, and factually the case-three further important
denotations of "literaL" After Thompson and Joule, heat is motion.
After Einstein, it is literally true that the speed of light is the same for
all observers. For those whose world of meanings has been transformed
by the gospel, Jesus is the Messiah.
Second, this is possible only if one allows for the fundamental shifts
in fields of meanings. For those who got the point of the surprising
affmnation, Jesus redefines what it is to be Messiah, just as the concept Messiah redefines Jesus' identity. Moreover, the fields of meanings associated with messianic expectation, Jesus, and God's relation
to humanity are transformed. Hence, reception is always a crucial dimension in the metaphoric process. The point of the affirmation will
be missed if the hearer is unable or unwilhng to recognize the intrinsic
changes in these fields of meanings.
This would be the case, for example, if a secular historian understood the predication univocally and so concluded that it is an analogy
that in some ways is justified, in other ways not. This would also be
the case if the affirmation is taken, whether by an historically naive
believer or skeptic, as asserting a univocal, non-metaphoric identification of Jesus and the Messiah. Both people would mi ss the
affirmation's logical significance. A univocal and literal reading in
that sense-a reading that does not negotiate the entailed shifts in fields
of meanmgs-will mistake the logic of the predication. Therefore,
recognizing Jesus as the Messiah requires what the prophets had called
teshuva, a fundamental "turning" or conversion in thinking and in identity.21
It was a shift in conception and identity that many at the time could
not see or accept, a shift that many of Jesus ' followers apparently
found difficult, and a shift whose far-reaching implications plainly
were not at all clear, at first, even to those who affirmed it. The logic
was not patently exphcit, conscious, or transparent. Nevertheless, the
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metaphoric point of this predication is neither to deny the identity nor
restrict its significance but to open up a logical space that enables us to
say more than would be possible' if the predication were interpreted as
either merely univocal (is) or merely dialectical (is not).

The Metaphoric Character of Rahner's Thought
Gerhart and Russell's conception of the metaphoric process provides. an \l\uminating elC.'j}tanation of the togic entaited in Rohner' s
appeal to the "analogical" and "transcendental" character of God-talk.
His performance is more subtle, innovative, and effective than his own
explanations. Inattention to such unarticulated but fundamental moves
in his thought is the source of significant misunderstanding among
some commentators and critics. For one thing, Rahner holds that "analogy" and "transcendental" are themselves analogous and transcendental conceptions. Pinning down their precise meaning and demonstrating that it is metaphoric requires attentive and extended analysis .
For the present purposes a brief overview of this claim and its justification must suffice.22
If one steps back from what Rahner says about analogous and transcendental statements and then exarnines how he actually uses such
language, it becomes clear that he is forcing an analogy. The effect is
to open up new fields of meanings and so a new logical and grammatical space in which it is possible to speak meaningfully of God, though
in a qualified, indirect, and somewhat apophatic way . Rahner insists
that this does not entail any grasping of God in concepts. His move is
a metaphoric act grounded in a very different understanding of how
we think and signify God in the [lIst place. This does not entail affirm\.n~ that God lS In some wa'is t\k.e and \n some wa'iS dilie-rent from
some putatlve analogue. LiKe l:l\\icn and 1:\aignt, ne -reslsts the claim
that concepts can grasp God in that way at all . But unlike Tillich' s and
Haight' s restrictive views of the range of predication, Rahner's argumentation reveals that he thinks we can force language as we normally use it to different purposes, shifting our fields of meanings as
they apply to God, so that conceptual room can be open for saying
something meaningful and substantive tbat grasps at God witbout
grasping God.
More specifically (although Rahner does not put it this way himself) the transcendental argument in its most basic conceptual move
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forces an analogy between two known elements that require a shift in
our fields of meanings. This opens up possibilities for predication otherwise unavai lable and unthinkable. The first known is what Rahner
caUs "transcendental" intentionality- the reflexive, indirect, and dynamic presence-to-self and antici pation (Vorgrif.!) of the hori zon of
knowing, love, and freedom. The second known is the more direct
grasp of specific objects as known, loved, and affirmed in freedom,
what he calls "categorial" intentionality.
Rahner forces an analogy by insisting that the model for knowing
and speaJUng of God is transcendental intentionality rather than
categorial intentionality, and by insisting that the former is not a derivative, secondary , or inferior activ ity , but the primary and grounding manifestation of the human spirit. Forcing this analogy-that is to
say, speaking of God as "transcendental reality"-<:reates a logical
space for talki ng about God, while insisting that God is the goal and
presupposition of human intentionality and never its object, and underlines that God is always beyond our grasp. The logic of God-talk,
for Rahner, is governed by the intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness of
this metaphoric signification. If this is forgotten, one falls into the
mistaken notion that transcendental reality is a transcendental "object" that can be known, spoken of, or described in the way we know
and speak about categorial objects.
Rahner is able to show that a similar logic applies to other transcendental "realities," such as the self or freedom, that are real and
that can be the grammatical objects of our predications even though
they are not entities perceptible by the senses. People do indeed speak
of such "things" as if they were objects in that sense. Moreover, people
take them as "real ." But even though people mi ght not be able to explain why, most would recognize the inappropriateness of questions
about the physical location of the self, its size, weight, color, taste, or
smeU. There is something metaphoric going on in much of our everyday talk about realities such as the "self," even though we do not normally call attention to this "stretching" of language and are not di scomforted by its peculiar logic.
Rahner's use of "Hol y Mystery," " nameless whither," "hori zon,"
and "asymptotic goal" as terms fo r God is meant to call attention to
such a metaphoric shift in signification and logic. Moreover, characteristic of metaphoric signification, the act of affi rming that God is
transcendental reality effects fundamental and global changes in the
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available theological and philosophical fields of meanings. Rahner
seeks to exploit these meanings in hi s various theological investigations. We have already seen him do this in his theology of symbol. His
affirmation that beings, and indeed being itself, are symbolic is itself a
metaphoric proposal. Accepting his suggestion forces a reconfiguration
of what symbol is, of how beings and being itself are, and of the fields
of meanings associated with each of these notions. Moreover, this
reconfiguration of fields of meanings makes available a logic in which,
contrary to expectations, symbol and symbolized are not opposed, indeed in which unity and diversity correlate in like, rather than inverse,
proportion.
It is true that Rahner explains and achieves this metaphoric move
within the context of his rather cerebral transcendental metaphysics.
He was inspired by Aquinas, who achieved a similar innovation in an
earlier philosophical context, quite different from our so-called postmodern world of meanings . Aquinas also required a significant
reconfiguration of the inteUectual idioms of his day. Following Gerhart
and Russell, however, it can be argued that the metaphoric process
that their theologies exempli fy is a more general epistemological activity entailed in the expansion of religious and theological understanding as well as other forms of scientific and artistic understanding.
Such moves are not a priori inimical to the sort of "intelligibility in
today's world" that Haight argues must be a crucial criterion for
christology. Contemporary belief structures, particularly those that have
created the possibility for new horizons of human understanding, are
built on such cognitive shifts in our fields of meaning. This argues for
a significant qualification of Haight's insistence that "one cannot logically affirm a belief that stands in contradiction with what one knows
to be true in a wider context" and that "the principle of non-contradiction rules out a compartmentalization of christological beliefs held in
a private sphere that do not correlate with what we positively know to
be the case from other spheres of life. "23 This norm can be granted, but
only so long as one takes into consideration those significant metaphoric acts in other spheres of life that reveal knowing as a process in
which our fields of meanings can be meaningfuUy stretched to unexpected uses, and our logic twisted in uncalled-for but warrantably productive ways. This qualification must be part of the equation, as well ,
in the application of Haight's positive articulation of the criterion: that
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"one's christological faith should find expression in belief structures
or ways of understanding that fit or correspond with the way reality is
understood generally in a given culture."24 A restrictive theory of the
symbolic that a priori rules out the metaphoric in theology and religion, or that relegates it to the non-cognitive and poetic, ignores the
significance of the metaphoric as a legitimate cognitive process in the
sciences and arts.
As I read them, Tillich and Haight also seek to force an analogy
when they claim that all talk of God is symbolic. Establishing this
reading is not necessary for the further development of the case I am
making for a metaphoric reading of christological symbols, but it does
provide an occasion to stress that making a metaphoric move does not
require an awareness that one is doing so or a commitment to a theory
such as Gerhart and Russell's. It also calls attention to the difference
between recognizing a move as metaphoric and judging it true or as
the most helpful conceptual move. Clarifying precisely how
christological predications logically function, whether as metaphoric
or symbolic in the various senses we have examined, is a crucial step
toward interpreting their meaning, but it is still preliminary to determining their truth. Our concern is with the question "What kind of
truth?" and so bears more indirectly on the question "Is it true?"

Hermeneutical Implications of a Metaphoric Reading
If the logic of christological predication is metaphoric in the sense
I have argued, rather than restrictively symbolic, Haight's genetic
hermeneutics loses much of its force. He acknowledges that his interpretation.presupposes his theory of symbol as the only viable alternative either to literal readings, which he contends are today historically
implausible, or to highly speculative metaphysical readings, which he
maintains are at best problematic for postmodern consciousness. But
a metaphoric libretto such as I have proposed here makes possible yet
another construal. The scope of this essay permits little more than this
bare suggestion itself and some of its hermeneutical implications. The
significant hi storical issues related to this claim or to Haight ' s
christo logical interpretations must be left to other occasions and to
those with appropriate expertise.
The focal point of contention follows directly from what has been
argued . If metaphoric acts in religion, theology, or other sc iences can
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sometimes adventitiously create the possibility for affirmin g an identity cl aim (a metaphoric analogy) that otherwise would have been unavailable and unthinkable, it has to be asked if similar conceptual moves
could not have been entailed in scripture and in the earl y refl ections of
the church that prepared the grounds for the formulati ons of Chalcedon
and Nicaea.
Thi s contrasts with Haight's interpretation of Jesus as the "Wi sdom of God" and "Logos of God ." The wisdom chri stology, he observes " is often considered a bridge to a full y three-stage, incarnational
understanding of a pre-existent Jesus Chri st. "25 The logos chri stology
"both resembles the other wi sdom chri stologies and transcends them
in the directi on of an explicit statement of the incarnation of an hypostatized being."26 He maintains that "what is happening in the development of the earlier wisdom chri stol ogy is evident: ' What Judaism said of Sophi a, Chri stian hymn-makers and epi stle writers now
come to say of Jesus. ' "27 Thi s conceptual move paved the way for
later assertions of Jesus' pre-ex istence, but in Haight's scenario those
later moves were not justified by the intentionality of the scriptural
texts that generated them. The originating meaning was very different
and contradicts the later, since the referent of these affirm ations was
the hi storical Jesus of Nazareth seen symbolically as a personification
and revelation of God. The referent was not a pre-existent being in
identity with God .
And what do these assertions mean ? . .. James Dunn, for example, recogni zes that in hi s wisdom chri stology Paul wanted to
show that Jesus is the new and exhaustive embodiment of divine
wisdom. He admits that Matthew transcends hi s source Q, where
Jesus is a messenger of wisdom, and identifies Jesus with
wisdom. It is clear that Jesus is being equated with the personification of God' s wisdom in the hymns like that of Colossians.
Moreove r, thi s metaphorical language of personification fin ally
led to a c hri stology in which Jesus is different in kind from other
mediations of God, and enjoys a metaphysically divine status of
personal pre-existence. But Dunn fail s to find in the Jewish
tradition pri or to Jesus any consideration of wi sdom as a hypostasis or di vine being; thi s would not fit with Jewi sh monotheism.
Wi sdom language remains fi gurati ve personification. It is thus at
least ambi guous that pre-ex istence represents the intention of
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these wisdom chri stologies, because one cannot really show that
thi s is more than the figurative language of metaphor and
personification . Is there a way out of this impasse?28
Haight responds "yes" and proposes that the issue can be sorted
out hermeneutically. Hi s first move is to argue that the historical Jesus
of Nazareth is the primary referent of such affi rmations. He next notes
that in such wisdom say ings the central theme is Jesus' role as one
who "reveals both the true nature of human ex istence and also the
nature of God."29 Haight reasons that the personification borrowed
from wi sdom language should be interpreted in thi s light. "These texts
are not providing unknowable information about transcendent realities from some secret source of knowledge. The epistemology of these
christologies begins from below, with Jesus, and their content is based
on the encounter of God in and through Jesus."30 So, he concludes, the
affirmations are symbolic: Jesus points to God but is not literally identified with God and does not pre-exist in identity with God . The
affi rmations are sy mbolic in this restrictive sense for two reasons: first,
because it is language about transcendental reality and, second, because "thi s is consciously developed language of personification."3l
On more careful analysis, the second reason is little more than a
variation on the first. Throughout Haight's work , it is clear that he
understands metaphor and personification in terms of hi s theory of the
symbolic. He notes early in the book that "descriptions of how metaphor functions resemble the dynamics of symbols."32 In his understaniling, the logic of metaphor and personification presuppose the
fundamental non-identity between the realities compared. They are
analogies in the common sense-not metaphoric. One term (or perhaps both terms) communicates information about the other. In so
doing, the analogies may introduce paradox, tension, and ambiguity
into the mea nings of the terms themselves, but the analogies do not
create fundamental changes in the field s of meanings or create the
possibility for new logical relations between them. They do not force
a new identity . So Haight tells us:
I indicated earli er how in a metaphor one thing is identified with
something different, as in "My husband is a bear." What immediately strikes the li stener or reader is the non-identity between
the implicitl y pared items. The creati ve imagi nati on is thus set in
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motion to formulate the similarity or point of identity: is he a
teddy or a grizzly? So too, analogously, to say that Jesus is a
parable of God introduces paradox, tension, and ambiguity in
Jesus' mediation of God . One must recognize immediately that
as a human being Jesus is Jesus, is not God, but points away from
himself to God.33
A similar logic applies in his interpretation of personification in
the Hebrew scriptures:

In some instances these metaphorical symbols in the Hebrew
scriptures are personified, and this personification became a very
significant factor in the development of christological and
trinitarian doctrine. Personification is a figure of speech: the
literal meaning of a personification, that is, the meaning intended
by the au thor of the personification, is not that the "hands of God"
refer to two actual hands, or that the Word of God is something
really distinct from God. When the metaphorical character of
personification is not respected, when it becomes hypostatized,
that is, conceived as objective and individual, in the same
measure the power of the symbol tends to be undermined. The
symbol can then be made to point to something distinct from
God, which in its tum acts as an intermediary between God and
the world. God 's transcendence and immanence in the world
become separated and competitive; God, as holy and transcendent, cannot be mixed up in this world but needs a messenger, an
angel, a Word. This goes against the primitive intention of the
sy mbol as referring in its first instance simply to God experienced in the world. 34
But do such metaphors always refer simply to God as experienced
in the world in that restrictive way? I suggested earlier that identifying
Jesus as Messiah is not a metaphor in the manner Haight defines, but
metaphoric in Gerhart and Ru ssell 's sense. It opens up and requires a
new way of conceiving Jesus, messianic hope, and God 's relation to
humanity. With thi s shift in fields of meanings, a new logic applies;
one can say properly and literally that Jesus is Messiah. Christians
proclaim nothing less. They do not proclaim him as a "sort of' Messiah.
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It is reasonable to suppose that a similar logical move is involved
in PhiJippians, Colossians, and the prologue to the Gospel of Johntheir authors were forcing new analogies stretching the available fields
of meanings and logical relations between them. If they were doing
something of the sort, it would not require that Jewish tradition prior
to Jesus had available thjs sense of wisdom as a pre-existent hypostasis or divine being; nor would it require that the authors intended to
appeaJ to such meanjngs. The point of a metaphoric analogy is to create conceptual room to say what could not have otherwise been srud
by forcing language and logic to a new use. There is as much evidence
for the claim that the disciples' reflection on a deeper level of their
experience of Jesus forced such a metaphoric expansion of the avruJable language and logic, as there is for Hrught' s assumption that what
followers of Jesus could have intended to say was restricted to the
fields of meanings available before such a metaphoric act or limited to
what would have been conceivable to those whose experience did not
force and warrant such a metaphoric process.
The tension between the historical Jesus and what is affirmed of
him in worship and scripture-and eventually in creed-supports the
metaphoric reading just as much as it supports Haight's restrictive
symbolic reading; it explains better the reaJism of the c1rums that Jesus
is Lord, the Word made flesh , and the image of the invisible God, the
firstborn of all creation. A metaphoric reaJism, like Haight's symbolic
reading, would insist that the logic of christology begins from below
with Jesus and with the historicaJ encounter of Jesus. By invoking
such reaJism, we would concur with Hrught:
It is .mistaken to read thi s wisdom language as though it were
strrughtforward descriptive language that told the story of a
divine being that descended to become Jesus. To understand this
language as descriptive language about a being who is "on the
side of the creator in the creator-creature distinction" is to
misinterpret the kind of language that is being used and its
epistemological provenance. These texts are not providing unknowable information about transcendent realities from some
secret source of knowledge . The epistemology of these
christologies begins from below, with Jesus, and their content is
based on the encounter of God in and through Jesus. Their
revelatory character in epistemologicaJ terms is ascending. To
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the question about God and what God is like, these texts testify
that Jesus mediates an answer. God is encountered in Jesus; God
is revealed in Jesus; God is likeJesus; the wisdom of God is made
manjfest in Jesus; Jesus is the wisdom of God . Jesus himself
responds to the questions, what is God 's wisdom and where is it
found?35
But a metaphoric reading would not concur with the conclusion
that talk of Jesus as God 's word incarnate is thereby illegitimate. Nor
would a metaphoric reading require us to conclude that subsequently
drawing implications for our understanding of God as triune is unwarranted. if such claims are metaphoric and if thjs metaphoric act is
justified, then within that context there is a warrant for the proper use
of such language and justification for predications that involve more
than the symbolic meanings envisioned by Haight. While Haight's
symbolic reading enables a vigorous affirmation of Jesus ' historical
reality, that reading severely restricts the divine. God and God ' s relation to creation seem bound by the logic that constrains beings and the
relations between beings. Thi s appears to be at the root of hi s objection that Rahner's Logos christology undermines the afflrmation of
Jesus' full humanity:
But despite hi s intentions and his strong affi rmations of Jesus'
real humanity, the suspicions arise at several points. Jesus is not
like us insofar as God is present to Jesus as Logos and God is
present to us as Spirit. in other words, God' s presence as Logos
to Jesus is a qualitatively different mode of presence than God 's
union with human beings generally. It seems metaphysically
inconceivable that thi s different presence to Jesus would not
make a substantial , ontological difference in him relative to
God 's presence to us. It would be an odd metaphysics that could
imagine God assuming a human nature without ontologically
transformjng that human nature. 36
It is an odd metaphysics only if one ass umes that the same logic
applies between God and beings as between beings themselves, only
if one assumes that God is a competing part of nature or of the world,
and only if one assumes that God ' s agency in the world is like other
kinds of agency. Despite Haight' s and Tillich ' s strong afftrmations to
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the contrary, their symbolic reading of incarnation has the simi larly
odd character of treating the di stinction between God and creatures as
if it were like other distinctions. They insist that in the case of God, as
in other cases, the "is" and "is not" must be either harmonized or different.
But are those the only two choices? A metaphoric reading would
say no, and question whether Haight's symbolic reali sm takes seriously enough the uniqueness of the di stinction between God and what
is not God. The metaphoric libretto would argue along with Robert
Sokolowski that the Christian sense of God entails a unique distinction between the divine and non-divine and that "once thi s new context is reached, new ' kinds' of differences become avai lable" that were
not available within philosophical and religious conceptual frameworks
prior to Christianity.37 It is preci sely this distinction in the notion of
divinity and this new conceptual framework, and not just the status of
Jesus, that Sokolowski argues was at stake in the christological controversies. The councils required a new understanding of the logic of
Christian talk about God and Jesus:
... They teU us that we must think of God as the one who can let
natural necessity be maintained and let reason be left intact: that
is, God is not himself a competing part of nature or a part of the
world. If the incarnation could not take place without a truncation
of human nature, it would mean that God was one of the natures
in the world that somehow was defined by not being the other
natures; it would mean that his presence in one of these other
natures, human nature, would involve a conflict and a need to
exclude some part of what he is united with .... But the Christian
God is not a part of the world and is not a "ki nd" of being at all .
Therefore the incarnation is not meaningless or impossible or
destructi ve.38
Does Haight worry about God 's transcendence and immanence in
the world becoming separated and competitive in hypostatized symbols because he has missed, and indeed precluded as possible, the
di stinction (the metaphoric shift) that Sokolowski discerns as a key
insight emerging from the classical christological controversies? Is it
not reasonable to view the innovations of wisdom and logos christology
in the first centuries as forcing an analogy and warranting a logic that
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open up the possibility for affirming both the identity between Jesus
and God, and the integrity of Jesus' humanity?-both the "is" and the
" is not" at once?
This short paper cannot settle the question . It has barely sketched
the outline of a constructi ve alternative for explaining the logic of
Christian talk about Jesus' signi ficance. An adequate critique of
Haight's response to the question would require more substantial analysis, as would a defense of a metaphoric reali sm. I can only hope that I
have played out enough of the overture to suggest the crucial themes
in the proposed metaphoric libretto and score.
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